{"id":14420,"date":"2026-04-03T19:39:32","date_gmt":"2026-04-03T16:39:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/?p=14420"},"modified":"2026-04-03T19:39:32","modified_gmt":"2026-04-03T16:39:32","slug":"critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp\/14420\/","title":{"rendered":"Trivy ve LiteLLM arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilen tedarik zinciri sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131: CI\/CD s\u00fcrecini CVE-2026-33634&#8217;ten koruma"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Milyonlarca otomatik yaz\u0131l\u0131m geli\u015ftirme s\u00fcreci, derleme s\u00fcrecine entegre edilmi\u015f Trivy ve Checkmarx AST gibi g\u00fcvenlik ara\u00e7lar\u0131na dayanmaktad\u0131r. Son zamanlarda modern tarihin en b\u00fcy\u00fck ve en tehlikeli <u>tedarik zinciri sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131ndan<\/u> birinin giri\u015f noktas\u0131 haline gelenler, tam da bu g\u00fcvenilir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlerdi. Bu yaz\u0131da, otomatikle\u015ftirilmi\u015f i\u015f ak\u0131\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n denetlenmesi ve kurumsal bulut altyap\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flama konular\u0131n\u0131 ele al\u0131yoruz.<\/p>\n<h2>Sald\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n zaman \u00e7izelgesi ve bilinen sonu\u00e7lar\u0131<\/h2>\n<p>19 Mart\u2019ta, CI\/CD s\u00fcre\u00e7lerinde yayg\u0131n olarak kullan\u0131lan a\u00e7\u0131k kaynakl\u0131 bir g\u00fcvenlik a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131 tarama arac\u0131 olan Trivy arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 bir hedefli tedarik zinciri sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirildi. TeamPCP olarak bilinen bir grup sald\u0131rgan, Trivy ile ili\u015fkili resmi GitHub Actions i\u015f ak\u0131\u015flar\u0131na ve Docker g\u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fclerine k\u00f6t\u00fc ama\u00e7l\u0131 yaz\u0131l\u0131m yerle\u015ftirmeyi ba\u015fard\u0131. Sonu\u00e7 olarak, ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilen her otomatik s\u00fcre\u00e7 taramas\u0131, sald\u0131r\u0131ya u\u011fram\u0131\u015f sistemlerden SSH anahtarlar\u0131n\u0131, bulut eri\u015fim belirte\u00e7lerini, kripto para c\u00fczdanlar\u0131n\u0131 ve di\u011fer de\u011ferli verileri \u00e7alan k\u00f6t\u00fc ama\u00e7l\u0131 yaz\u0131l\u0131mlar\u0131 tetikledi. Olay\u0131n kritik niteli\u011fi g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcne al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, bu olaya <a href=\"https:\/\/nvd.nist.gov\/vuln\/detail\/CVE-2026-33634\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">CVE-2026-33634<\/a> kimlik numaras\u0131 atand\u0131 ve CVSS4B puan\u0131 9,4 olarak belirlendi; bu, maksimum puana \u00e7ok yak\u0131n bir de\u011fer.<\/p>\n<p>Ayn\u0131 g\u00fcn\u00fcn ilerleyen saatlerinde, Trivy ekibi sald\u0131r\u0131y\u0131 tespit etti ve da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m kanallar\u0131ndan zararl\u0131 \u00f6\u011feleri kald\u0131rarak sald\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n bu a\u015famas\u0131n\u0131 durdurdu. Ancak sald\u0131rganlar, \u00e7ok say\u0131da Trivy kullan\u0131c\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n sistemlerine \u00e7oktan eri\u015fim sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>23 Mart\u2019ta, ba\u015fka bir uygulama g\u00fcvenli\u011fi arac\u0131nda da <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sysdig.com\/blog\/teampcp-expands-supply-chain-compromise-spreads-from-trivy-to-checkmarx-github-actions\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">benzer bir durum<\/a> tespit edildi: Checkmarx KICS i\u00e7in bir GitHub Action ve Checkmarx AST. \u00dc\u00e7 saat sonra, k\u00f6t\u00fc ama\u00e7l\u0131 kod oradan da kald\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131. TeamPCP, Checkmarx taraf\u0131ndan desteklenen <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/ReversingLabs\/status\/2036193573796978729?s=20\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">OpenVSX eklentilerini<\/a> de ele ge\u00e7irmeyi ba\u015fard\u0131: <em>cx-dev-assist<\/em> 1.7.0 ve <em>ast-results<\/em>. Olay\u0131n bu k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131n ne zaman \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne dair haberler birbirinden farkl\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>24 Mart\u2019ta, Trivy\u2019nin kod tarama \u00f6zelli\u011fini kullanan pop\u00fcler bir proje olan LiteLLM yapay zeka a\u011f ge\u00e7idi (\u00e7e\u015fitli b\u00fcy\u00fck dil modelleri sa\u011flay\u0131c\u0131lar\u0131na eri\u015fim sa\u011flayan evrensel bir k\u00fct\u00fcphane) sald\u0131r\u0131ya u\u011frad\u0131. PyPI deposuna y\u00fcklenen 1.82.7 ve 1.82.8 s\u00fcr\u00fcmleri ele ge\u00e7irildi. Bu s\u00fcr\u00fcmler yakla\u015f\u0131k be\u015f saat boyunca herkesin eri\u015fimine a\u00e7\u0131k kald\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Ancak sald\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n sadece birka\u00e7 saat s\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015f olmas\u0131, onu g\u00f6z ard\u0131 etmek i\u00e7in bir neden de\u011fildir. Etkilenen projelerin pop\u00fclerli\u011fi g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcne al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, bu k\u00f6t\u00fc ama\u00e7l\u0131 kod binlerce kez \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olabilir, hatta \u00e7ok b\u00fcy\u00fck \u015firketlerin altyap\u0131lar\u0131 i\u00e7inde bile.<\/p>\n<p>Bu durum, sald\u0131rganlar\u0131n Kubernetes k\u00fcmelerinde kal\u0131c\u0131 arka kap\u0131lar kurmas\u0131na ve ayr\u0131ca JavaScript npm ekosisteminde kendi kendini \u00e7o\u011faltan <a href=\"https:\/\/www.stepsecurity.io\/blog\/canisterworm-how-a-self-propagating-npm-worm-is-spreading-backdoors-across-the-ecosystem\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">CanisterWorm<\/a>\u2018u yaymas\u0131na olanak sa\u011flad\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Sald\u0131rganlar\u0131n kodunda, ele ge\u00e7irilen sistemde Tahran saat dilimini veya ana dil olarak Fars\u00e7a\u2019y\u0131 tespit etmesi durumunda Kubernetes k\u00fcmesini ve t\u00fcm d\u00fc\u011f\u00fcmlerini silip yok eden <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aikido.dev\/blog\/teampcp-stage-payload-canisterworm-iran\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">y\u0131k\u0131c\u0131 \u00f6zellikler<\/a> bulunmaktad\u0131r. Di\u011fer b\u00f6lgelerde ise bu k\u00f6t\u00fc ama\u00e7l\u0131 yaz\u0131l\u0131m, CanisterWorm\u2019u kullanarak verileri \u00e7almaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>Uzmanlara g\u00f6re 20.000\u2019den fazla depo, potansiyel olarak g\u00fcvenlik a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131na sahip olarak de\u011ferlendiriliyor. Sald\u0131rganlar, y\u00fczlerce gigabaytl\u0131k veri ve <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bleepingcomputer.com\/news\/security\/popular-litellm-pypi-package-compromised-in-teampcp-supply-chain-attack\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">yar\u0131m milyondan fazla hesap<\/a> ele ge\u00e7irdiklerini iddia ediyorlar.<\/p>\n<h2>Trivy Nas\u0131l Sald\u0131r\u0131ya U\u011frad\u0131?<\/h2>\n<p>Sald\u0131rganlar, Trivy\u2019yi ele ge\u00e7irmek i\u00e7in daha \u00f6nceki bir olayda \u00e7al\u0131nan kimlik bilgilerini kulland\u0131lar. \u015eubat ay\u0131 sonlar\u0131nda meydana gelen <a href=\"https:\/\/cybernews.com\/security\/claude-powered-ai-bot-compromises-five-github-repositories\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">\u00f6nceki Trivy sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131<\/a> muhtemelen tam olarak \u00f6nlenememi\u015fti ve sald\u0131rganlar (ayn\u0131 TeamPCP grubu) yeni bir sald\u0131r\u0131yla geri d\u00f6nd\u00fc. Trivy\u2019nin geli\u015ftiricisi Aqua Security, \u00f6nceki olay\u0131n ard\u0131ndan kimlik bilgilerinin kademeli olarak kullan\u0131mdan kald\u0131r\u0131lmakta olmas\u0131 nedeniyle, sald\u0131rganlar\u0131n ele ge\u00e7irilen eski eri\u015fim belirte\u00e7leri iptal edilmeden \u00f6nce kendileri i\u00e7in yeni eri\u015fim belirte\u00e7leri olu\u015fturabildiklerini <a href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/aquasecurity\/trivy\/discussions\/10425\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">tahmin ediyor<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Sonu\u00e7 olarak, TeamPCP, CI\/CD s\u00fcre\u00e7lerinde kullan\u0131lan GitHub Actions\u2019\u0131 ele ge\u00e7irmeyi ba\u015fard\u0131. Etiket yazma yetkisine sahip kimlik bilgilerini kullanan sald\u0131rganlar; aquasecurity\/trivy-action \u00fczerindeki 77 s\u00fcr\u00fcm etiketinden 76\u2019s\u0131n\u0131 ve aquasecurity\/setup-trivy \u00fczerindeki yedi etiketin tamam\u0131n\u0131 zorla de\u011fi\u015ftirerek, mevcut g\u00fcvenilir s\u00fcr\u00fcmleri zararl\u0131 kod kay\u0131tlar\u0131na y\u00f6nlendirdi. Bu, <a href=\"https:\/\/securelist.com\/shai-hulud-2-0\/118214\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Shai-Hulud 2.0 sald\u0131r\u0131 kampanyas\u0131nda<\/a> g\u00f6zlemlenen taktiklere benziyor. Sonu\u00e7 olarak, da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m s\u00fcrecindeki i\u015f ak\u0131\u015flar\u0131 sald\u0131rganlar\u0131n kodunu \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131rmaya ba\u015flad\u0131; ancak s\u00fcr\u00fcm meta verilerinde g\u00f6zle g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcr bir de\u011fi\u015fiklik yoktu.<\/p>\n<p>Ayn\u0131 zamanda sald\u0131rganlar, GitHub Releases ve kapsay\u0131c\u0131 kay\u0131t defterleri dahil olmak \u00fczere resmi da\u011f\u0131t\u0131m kanallar\u0131na vir\u00fcs bula\u015fm\u0131\u015f bir Trivy ikili dosyas\u0131 (v0.69.4) yay\u0131nlad\u0131lar.<\/p>\n<h2>LiteLLM G\u00fcvenlik \u0130hlali<\/h2>\n<p>Pop\u00fcler dil modeli eri\u015fim arac\u0131 LiteLLM\u2019nin g\u00fcvenli\u011finin ihlali, bu arac\u0131 kullanan projeler zincirinde b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00e7apl\u0131 bir sald\u0131r\u0131 dalgas\u0131n\u0131 tetikleyebilir. Sald\u0131r\u0131, 24 Mart 2026 tarihinde TeamPCP\u2019nin k\u00fct\u00fcphanenin k\u00f6t\u00fc ama\u00e7l\u0131 s\u00fcr\u00fcmlerini (1.82.7 ve 1.82.8) PyPI\u2019de do\u011frudan yay\u0131nlamas\u0131yla ger\u00e7ekle\u015fti. 10:39 UTC ile 16:00 UTC aras\u0131nda, bu g\u00fcvenli\u011fi ihlal edilmi\u015f paketler, kimlik bilgilerini \u00e7alan k\u00f6t\u00fc ama\u00e7l\u0131 yaz\u0131l\u0131mlar i\u00e7eriyordu. Bu, <em>proxy_server.py<\/em> dosyas\u0131na yerle\u015fik olarak bulunuyordu ve 1.82.8 s\u00fcr\u00fcm\u00fcnde ayr\u0131ca zararl\u0131 bir <em>litellm_init<\/em> dosyas\u0131 da bulunuyordu. \u00c7al\u0131nan veriler, <em>models.litellm[.]cloud<\/em> sunucusuna aktar\u0131ld\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>S\u0131k\u0131 s\u00fcr\u00fcm kilitleme uygulamas\u0131 sayesinde LiteLLM Cloud veya resmi LiteLLM Proxy Docker g\u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fc kullanan m\u00fc\u015fteriler bu durumdan etkilenmezken, belirtilen zaman aral\u0131\u011f\u0131nda pip arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla sabitlenmemi\u015f s\u00fcr\u00fcmleri y\u00fckleyen geli\u015ftiriciler ve bunlardan yararlanan projeler tehlikeye maruz kald\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>\u00dc\u00e7 saat i\u00e7inde, k\u00f6t\u00fc ama\u00e7l\u0131 paketler PyPI deposundan kald\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131; LiteLLM ekibi ise yeni s\u00fcr\u00fcmlerin yay\u0131nlanmas\u0131n\u0131 ask\u0131ya ald\u0131, eri\u015fim bilgilerini yeniledi ve harici bir olay m\u00fcdahale s\u00fcrecini devreye soktu. Projelerinde LiteLLM kullanan ekiplerin, derhal <em>litellm_init.pth<\/em> g\u00fcvenlik ihlali g\u00f6stergesini kontrol etmeleri ve potansiyel olarak ele ge\u00e7irilmi\u015f olabilecek t\u00fcm gizli bilgileri d\u00fczenli aral\u0131klarla de\u011fi\u015ftirmeleri tavsiye edilir.<\/p>\n<h2>TeamPCP Cloud Stealer k\u00f6t\u00fc ama\u00e7l\u0131 yaz\u0131l\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6zellikleri<\/h2>\n<p>Sald\u0131rganlar, orijinal i\u015flevselli\u011fi koruyarak GitHub Actions ve Trivy y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclebilir dosyas\u0131na yeni kodlar eklediler. Trivy arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla yap\u0131lan g\u00fcvenlik a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131 taramas\u0131 sonu\u00e7lar\u0131 normal g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyordu, ancak ayn\u0131 zamanda de\u011ferli veriler aran\u0131yor ve \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131l\u0131yordu. K\u00f6t\u00fc ama\u00e7l\u0131 kod \u015fu i\u015flemleri ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftiriyordu:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Ke\u015fif yapmak (a\u011f verilerini ve ortam de\u011fi\u015fkenlerini toplamak);<\/li>\n<li>AWS ve GCP bulut ortamlar\u0131na eri\u015fmek i\u00e7in belirte\u00e7leri ve eri\u015fim anahtarlar\u0131n\u0131 aramak;<\/li>\n<li><em>Runner.Worker<\/em> ve <em>Runner.Listener<\/em> i\u015flemlerinin belle\u011finde depolanan gizli bilgileri elde etmek i\u00e7in belle\u011fi tarama (<em>\/proc\/*\/mem<\/em>);<\/li>\n<li>Kubernetes gizli bilgilerini \u00e7\u0131karma (<em>\/run\/secrets\/kubernetes.io\/serviceaccount<\/em>);<\/li>\n<li>Veri taban\u0131 sunucular\u0131na (MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Redis, Vault) ba\u011flanmak i\u00e7in veri toplama;<\/li>\n<li>Ortam dosyalar\u0131 ve CI\/CD yap\u0131land\u0131rma dosyalar\u0131ndan (<em>.env, .json, .yml<\/em>) di\u011fer API anahtarlar\u0131n\u0131 ve gizli bilgileri toplamak;<\/li>\n<li>Slack ve Discord kanallar\u0131 i\u00e7in webhook\u2019lar\u0131 arama;<\/li>\n<li>Kripto c\u00fczdanlar\u0131yla ilgili verileri aramak (Solana blok zinciriyle ilgili de\u011fi\u015fkenlerin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra <em>rpcuser<\/em> ve <em>rpcpassword<\/em> verileri).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Toplanan veriler \u015fifrelenerek, Trivy\u2019nin geli\u015ftiricilerinin ad\u0131yla benzer bir ada sahip bir sunucuya (<em>scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org<\/em>) y\u00fcklendi. Bir yedekleme mekanizmas\u0131 olarak sald\u0131rganlar, <em>docs-tpcp<\/em> adl\u0131 bir depoya veri y\u00fcklemek i\u00e7in bir y\u00f6ntem sa\u011flad\u0131lar.<\/p>\n<p>CheckMarx ve LiteLLM\u2019ye y\u00f6nelik sald\u0131r\u0131da, di\u011fer yaz\u0131m hatas\u0131 i\u00e7eren alan adlar\u0131nda oldu\u011fu gibi benzer bir taktik kullan\u0131ld\u0131: <em>models.litellm[.]cloud<\/em> ve <em>checkmarx[.]zone<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>K\u00f6t\u00fc ama\u00e7l\u0131 yaz\u0131l\u0131m\u0131n ayr\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 teknik analizi ve g\u00fcvenlik ihlali g\u00f6stergeleri, <a href=\"https:\/\/securelist.com\/litellm-supply-chain-attack\/119257\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Securelist blogundaki<\/a> uzman\u0131m\u0131z\u0131n makalesinde bulunabilir.<\/p>\n<h2>CVE-2026-33634 i\u00e7in M\u00fcdahale ve Savunma Stratejileri<\/h2>\n<p>Kamu kay\u0131t defterlerinde mevcut olan imza tabanl\u0131 kontroller ve ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131k taramalar\u0131 art\u0131k yeterli de\u011fildir; zira k\u00f6t\u00fc ama\u00e7l\u0131 kod, g\u00fcvenilir ve imzalanm\u0131\u015f eylemlerin i\u00e7ine do\u011frudan yerle\u015ftirilmi\u015f ve davran\u0131\u015fsal izleme uygulanana kadar tespit edilememi\u015ftir. CI\/CD s\u00fcre\u00e7leri, g\u00fcvenli\u011fin \u201cyeni s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131\u201d haline gelmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Acil \u00d6nlemler. <\/strong>T\u00fcm i\u015f ak\u0131\u015flar\u0131nda g\u00fcvenli s\u00fcr\u00fcmlerin kullan\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan emin olun (Trivy ikili dosyas\u0131 0.69.3, trivy-action 0.35.0, setup-trivy 0.2.6).<\/p>\n<p>CI\/CD s\u00fcre\u00e7leri y\u00f6neticileri ve g\u00fcvenlik ekipleri, Checkmarx (kics-github-action, ast-github-action) ve Trivy (setup-trivy ve trivy-action) \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlerine olan ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 derhal g\u00f6zden ge\u00e7irmelidir. \u0130\u015f ak\u0131\u015flar\u0131 belirli bir SHA karma de\u011feri yerine bir s\u00fcr\u00fcm etiketine at\u0131fta bulunuyorsa, aktif tedarik zinciri sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n s\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc s\u00fcre boyunca i\u015f ak\u0131\u015f\u0131 y\u00fcr\u00fctme g\u00fcnl\u00fcklerinizi dikkatle inceleyin.<\/p>\n<p>Ayr\u0131ca, a\u011f g\u00fcnl\u00fcklerinizi kontrol ederek <em>scan.aquasecurtiy[.]org<\/em>, <em>checkmarx[.]zone<\/em> ve <em>models.litellm[.]cloud<\/em> alan adlar\u0131na y\u00f6nelik trafi\u011fi de kontrol etmelisiniz. Bu t\u00fcr bir trafi\u011fin varl\u0131\u011f\u0131, hassas verilerin ba\u015far\u0131yla s\u0131zd\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6sterir.<\/p>\n<p>Kurulu\u015fun GitHub\u2019\u0131nda \u201cdocs-tpcp\u201d adl\u0131 bir depo ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015fsa, bu durum bir veri ihlalinin ger\u00e7ekle\u015fti\u011fini de g\u00f6sterebilir.<\/p>\n<p>Ana bilgisayarlar\u0131 ve k\u00fcmeleri g\u00fcvenlik ihlali belirtileri a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan kontrol edin: ~\/.config\/sysmon\/sysmon.py dosyalar\u0131n\u0131n varl\u0131\u011f\u0131, Kubernetes\u2019teki \u015f\u00fcpheli pod\u2019lar.<\/p>\n<p>\u00d6nbelle\u011fi temizleyin ve PyPI mod\u00fcllerinin bir envanterini \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131n; zararl\u0131 mod\u00fclleri kontrol edin ve temiz s\u00fcr\u00fcmlerine geri d\u00f6n\u00fcn.<\/p>\n<p>Her hal\u00fckarda, sistemlerin ele ge\u00e7irildi\u011fi ve sald\u0131rganlar\u0131n etkilenen sistemler i\u00e7inde h\u0131zla ilerledi\u011fi varsay\u0131m\u0131yla, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/enterprise-security\/compromise-assessment?icid=tr_kdailyplacehold_acq_ona_smm__onl_b2b_kasperskydaily_wpplaceholder_______\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">proaktif bir Tehdit Avc\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131<\/a> ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilmelidir.<\/p>\n<p>Etkilenen ortamlar\u0131n, do\u011frulanm\u0131\u015f yedeklemelerden geri y\u00fcklenmesi tavsiye edilir.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131k sabitleme ve gizli bilgi y\u00f6netimi. <\/strong>T\u00fcm s\u00fcre\u00e7lerde ve Docker dosyalar\u0131nda ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131k s\u00fcr\u00fcmlerinin kriptografik karma de\u011ferleri kullan\u0131larak sabitlendi\u011finden emin olun. Bir gizli bilgi y\u00f6netimi arac\u0131 kullanarak uzun \u00f6m\u00fcrl\u00fc belirte\u00e7lerden k\u0131sa \u00f6m\u00fcrl\u00fc kimlik bilgilerine ge\u00e7i\u015f yapman\u0131z\u0131 ve desteklenen durumlarda OIDC entegrasyonlar\u0131n\u0131 hayata ge\u00e7irmenizi \u00f6neririz. \u00c7al\u0131\u015fma zaman\u0131 ortam\u0131na gizli bilgilerin aktar\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 en aza indirin ve bunu yaln\u0131zca kesinlikle gerekli oldu\u011funda yap\u0131n. Gizli bilgilerin diskte veya ge\u00e7ici dosyalarda saklanmad\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan ve farkl\u0131 i\u015flemler aras\u0131nda yeniden kullan\u0131lmad\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan emin olun.<\/p>\n<p>G\u00fcvenli\u011fi ihlal edilmi\u015f olabilecek t\u00fcm kimlik bilgilerini (API anahtarlar\u0131, ortam de\u011fi\u015fkenleri, SSH anahtarlar\u0131, Kubernetes hizmet hesab\u0131 belirte\u00e7leri ve di\u011fer gizli bilgiler) d\u00fczenli aral\u0131klarla de\u011fi\u015ftirin.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Di\u011fer g\u00fcvenlik \u00f6nlemleri. <\/strong>Yaln\u0131zca kurulu\u015f taraf\u0131ndan onaylanan listede yer alan GitHub Actions i\u015flemlerine izin verin; yeni ve do\u011frulanmam\u0131\u015f i\u015flemleri engelleyin. <em>GITHUB_TOKEN<\/em> ve di\u011fer eri\u015fim anahtarlar\u0131n\u0131 en az ayr\u0131cal\u0131k ilkesine uygun olarak yap\u0131land\u0131r\u0131n. Kesinlikle gerekli olmad\u0131k\u00e7a yazma izni vermeyin.<\/p>\n<p>GitHub Actions\u2019\u0131n g\u00fcvenli\u011fini art\u0131rmak i\u00e7in \u00e7e\u015fitli a\u00e7\u0131k kaynakl\u0131 ara\u00e7lar mevcuttur:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>zizmor \u2013 GitHub Actions\u2019da statik analiz ve yap\u0131land\u0131rma hatalar\u0131n\u0131n tespitine y\u00f6nelik bir ara\u00e7;<\/li>\n<li>gato ve Gato-X \u2013 yap\u0131sal a\u00e7\u0131dan zay\u0131f s\u00fcre\u00e7leri tespit etmeye yard\u0131mc\u0131 olan bir arac\u0131n iki s\u00fcr\u00fcm\u00fc;<\/li>\n<li>allstar \u2013 OpenSSF taraf\u0131ndan geli\u015ftirilen, GitHub kurulu\u015flar\u0131nda ve depolar\u0131nda g\u00fcvenlik ilkelerini yap\u0131land\u0131rmak ve uygulamak i\u00e7in kullan\u0131lan bir GitHub uygulamas\u0131.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Tedarik zinciri sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131 hakk\u0131nda daha fazla bilgi edinmek isterseniz, <a href=\"https:\/\/kas.pr\/k8rs\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Tedarik Zinciri Reaksiyonu: Kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 Ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131k \u00c7a\u011f\u0131nda K\u00fcresel Dijital Ekosistemin G\u00fcvenli\u011fi<\/a> ba\u015fl\u0131kl\u0131 analiz raporumuzu incelemenizi \u00f6neririz. Bu rapor, teknik uzmanlar\u0131n g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015flerine dayanmaktad\u0131r ve kurulu\u015flar\u0131n tedarik zinciri ve g\u00fcvenilir ili\u015fkilerle ilgili risklerle ne s\u0131kl\u0131kla kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131, hangi alanlarda koruma eksiklikleri bulundu\u011funu ve bu t\u00fcr tehditlere kar\u015f\u0131 dayan\u0131kl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 art\u0131rmak i\u00e7in hangi stratejilerin uygulanmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fini ortaya koymaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n<input type=\"hidden\" class=\"category_for_banner\" value=\"mdr\"><input type=\"hidden\" class=\"placeholder_for_banner\" data-cat_id=\"mdr\" value=\"12181\">\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>A\u00e7\u0131k kaynakl\u0131 g\u00fcvenlik \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmleri, di\u011fer pop\u00fcler uygulamalara y\u00f6nelik b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00e7apl\u0131 bir sald\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n nas\u0131l ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7 noktas\u0131 haline geldi ve bunlar\u0131 kullanan kurulu\u015flar ne yapmal\u0131d\u0131r?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2706,"featured_media":14425,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1351],"tags":[1781,790,1611,2854,537,878],"class_list":{"0":"post-14420","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-threats","8":"tag-acik-kaynak","9":"tag-guvenlik-aciklari","10":"tag-tedarik-zinciri","11":"tag-tedarik-zinciri-saldirilari","12":"tag-tehditler","13":"tag-teknoloji"},"hreflang":[{"hreflang":"tr","url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp\/14420\/"},{"hreflang":"en-in","url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.in\/blog\/critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp\/30309\/"},{"hreflang":"en-ae","url":"https:\/\/me-en.kaspersky.com\/blog\/critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp\/25363\/"},{"hreflang":"en-gb","url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.uk\/blog\/critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp\/30159\/"},{"hreflang":"es-mx","url":"https:\/\/latam.kaspersky.com\/blog\/critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp\/29085\/"},{"hreflang":"ru","url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.ru\/blog\/critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp\/41587\/"},{"hreflang":"x-default","url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com\/blog\/critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp\/55510\/"},{"hreflang":"fr","url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.fr\/blog\/critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp\/23768\/"},{"hreflang":"pt-br","url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.br\/blog\/critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp\/24855\/"},{"hreflang":"de","url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.de\/blog\/critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp\/33335\/"},{"hreflang":"ru-kz","url":"https:\/\/blog.kaspersky.kz\/critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp\/30454\/"},{"hreflang":"en-au","url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.au\/blog\/critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp\/36042\/"},{"hreflang":"en-za","url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/critical-supply-chain-attack-trivy-litellm-checkmarx-teampcp\/35701\/"}],"acf":[],"banners":"","maintag":{"url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/tag\/tedarik-zinciri\/","name":"tedarik zinciri"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14420","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2706"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14420"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14420\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14422,"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14420\/revisions\/14422"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14425"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14420"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14420"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.tr\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14420"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}